When comparing oil prices to prior shocks, you need to adjust for inflation. The magnitude of the current price shock is much smaller than in Russia-Ukraine or 2008. The greater risk is a physical commodity shortage.

The concern was similar in Ukraine—it's about market perception of tail risks, not what eventually happens. Oil proved fungible and recovered, but the risk premium took years to come out.

On the day Russia invaded Ukraine, I went through the historical script and it worked out exactly. We are at a place where things need to get worse to get better, to put pressure on both sides.

I don't think so. The experience of the 1973-74 oil shocks is that if you accommodate by cutting short rates, the 10-year yield starts going up. We are in a phase where all rates are going up.

Some is a rates story, but what's going on across markets and within equities is de-grossing—cutting overweights and covering shorts. Performance recently has a strong negative relationship with prior three-month performance, with about half coming from positioning.